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Ms. Dahlab, a Muslim teacher wearing a headscarf at a Swiss public primary school, was told by the European Court of Human Rights that wearing a headscarf 
 ‘might have some kind of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils’.​[1]​
For this reason her dismissal was legitimate and did not violate her right to freedom of religion as protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.
The school board of a Dutch public school, however, which also refused to allow a Muslim teacher to wear her headscarf in the classroom, was told by the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission that it could not presume that wearing a headscarf identified the teacher, as the school contended, 
 ‘…with a group which does not only live according to strict opinions themselves, but which also has shown little tolerance towards persons with different opinions within the same religion’ and as someone who ‘…bears witness of holding very stringent opinions, also in comparison with the large majority of her fellow-believers, and may thus be perceived as threatening to other women and girls of the same religion, who mostly achieved the right to a freer way of living with difficulty’.​[2]​
According to the Equal Treatment Commission, the board had to assess on an individual basis whether the woman concerned indeed held such opinions and would not have the required open and neutral attitude towards her pupils. Thus the refusal of the board to hire her was not legitimate. 
The two cases show two quite different approaches, with two different results stemming from a different legal method of review. The first starts from a generalization about the meaning of the headscarf; the other from an individualized assessment what the headscarf means for the individual person. 
Which is the better approach to take in this type of case? And how would it work in other hard cases? To find an answer to these questions I will take a closer look at the approach taken in both cases by the European Court of Human Rights and the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission respectively (paragraph 2) and subsequently try to apply the approach which I think is the better one to two other hard cases. The first regards the issue of wearing a burqa in the classroom (paragraph 3), the second the issue of a judge wearing a headscarf in the courtroom (paragraph 4). After this analysis I will draw some (tentative) conclusions (paragraph 5)
3.	Similar principles, different approaches, different results
Interestingly, in their decisions concerning a teacher who is not allowed to manifest her religion by wearing a headscarf in a public school class room, the European Court of Human Rights and the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission agree on several basic principles. Firstly, they agree that both sex equality and state neutrality are fundamental norms in a modern democratic state. Secondly, they agree that these should be guaranteed in public education.​[3]​ The European Court confirms the Swiss courts decision that if a conflict exists with certain manifestations of religion, sex equality and state neutrality prevail. The Equal Treatment Commission follows a similar line, be it implicitly: having and manifesting a neutral, that is respectful and open attitude towards all religions and convictions is a legitimate requirement for a public school teacher. If it is shown such attitude is lacking, a person can be refused for the job. So in case of conflict, religious freedom cannot prevail either.
Their main difference then regards the assessment whether a conflict does indeed exist to start with. The European Court decides it does, the Equal Treatment Commission is not convinced. Especially the way to decide this question makes the difference. The European Court focuses on the question of what the headscarf means in general. It does not in fact say that any religious symbol detracts from the required neutrality the state has to guarantee in a public school class room. It specifically relates the Islamic headscarf to negative values and attitudes and thus to broadcasting a message that is incompatible with the values underlying the modern democratic state. The Equal Treatment Commission on the other hand deems the relevant question to be what the headscarf means for the individual woman concerned. Does it detract from the open and neutral attitude towards all religions and convictions that she is required to show to her pupils?
In my view the latter is the better approach. I have several arguments for this. To start with, as human rights are individual rights, they protect persons in their individual capacity. Ascribing (presumed) group-based characteristics to individuals (such as presuming a headscarf shows intolerance in any person wearing it) is thus very suspect, especially if this regards groups which are specifically protected by non-discrimination provisions, as is the case with race, sex, religion etc. Borrowing terminology used in North-American jurisprudence: classifications based on generalizations affecting sensitive groups can only be allowed if a tight or close ‘fit’ exists between the classification and its (legitimate) purpose.​[4]​ In the case at hand: excluding all teachers wearing a headscarf (the classification) because of a presumption that this is the manifestation of an intolerant and non-neutral attitude that is unacceptable for a public school teacher (the legitimate purpose), can only be allowed if in fact a tight or close fit exists between wearing a headscarf and displaying intolerant, non-neutral attitudes.
In this respect, it seems very hard if not impossible to assess what wearing a headscarf stands for in general. Theologically many different views exist. Some Muslim groups will contend it is not a religious obligation to start with, but a cultural practice, whereas others will view the obligation for women to cover themselves to go much further than just wearing a headscarf indeed. With so many different theological interpretations existing within the religious group concerned itself, judges should keep their distance and avoid taking a position in such sensitive discussions.​[5]​ 
Empirically many different meanings can be discerned as well, as research in several European countries shows. Quite a number of people seem to regard the headscarf as a symbol of negative views within Islam on the position of women, yet this meaning is highly contested. ​[6]​ By wearing a headscarf Muslim women may simply show they want to adhere to their Islamic identity. Identifying with their Islamic background is not to say they perceive and experience Islam in a traditional way and endorse notions of male dominance over women. In the western context they seem to be developing a western version of Islam.​[7]​ Quite another message the headscarf might convey is a political one. The political message may range from support for fundamentalist, political Islam to solidarity with Muslims worldwide or a refusal to assimilate in the wider western culture. This message is often claimed to create unrest and strife, and thus to endanger public order.​[8]​ A third reason to wear a headscarf can be more plainly religious and flow from the conviction the Koran prescribes it to show modesty in women and to protect women from unsolicited attentions of men, and/or more generally to say no to the way sexuality figures in western society.
 Surprisingly, the European Court of Human Rights does not refer to any research on this issue, but selects one possible meaning of the headscarf and presents it as some self-evident truth. Besides, the meaning the Court selects does not seem to be the most obvious meaning in the western European context. In this context it seems many young, educated Muslim women, that is women who are clearly not the ones lagging behind in the emancipation process, often start wearing a headscarf to show they wish to participate in society without foregoing their Islamic identity. Interestingly, this point was explicitly acknowledged by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Constitutional Court, in the case of Ludin. This case also concerned a Muslim teacher at a public school who was dismissed because of her headscarf. The Bundesverfassungsgericht held that prohibiting a teacher in a public school to wear a headscarf must have a basis in law and that it is up to the legislatures of the Länder (states) to decide whether valid reasons exist to do so. At the same time, it explicitly stated that such a decision could not be based on the presumption that wearing a headscarf is symbolic of women’s oppression. The German Court referred to recent research which shows young women often start wearing a headscarf to lead self chosen lives without foregoing their culture of origin.​[9]​ All in all it seems clear from the research available that no close ‘fit’ exists between wearing a headscarf and intolerant opinions and attitudes.
A third reason for preferring an individualized approach to decide the question whether wearing a headscarf is (in)compatible with the respectful and neutral attitude required of a public school teacher is a more pragmatic one. It seems it is quite unnecessary to start from gross generalizations. In the context of issues like this, an individual assessment of the required open and neutral attitude is possible and is in fact necessary anyway to select suitable teachers: neutral looking teachers have to be questioned as well about their attitudes towards all religions and convictions to make sure the right persons are selected for the job. Teachers with the wrong attitude are the real problem, which has to be assessed at selection and subsequently at periodic evaluations. 
A last reason for taking an individualized perspective lies in the importance of evading a major danger inherent in the Court’s approach, which is its vulnerability to taking on board all kinds of unsubstantiated generalizations, presumptions and even prejudices.
All in all, the Court’s approach may lead more easily to the conclusion that a conflict between rights and/or principles exists where in fact it does not. So the method of review makes a big difference here. If this assessment is correct, the next question is whether the individualized approach which seems the better one is feasible in other hard cases as well. 
4.	Burqa’s in the classroom
Another hard case which has surfaced in several as yet isolated instances regards wearing a burqa in public education. In the Netherlands several cases concerning pupils wearing a burqa or niqab reached the Equal Treatment Commission. In the United Kingdom a recent case dealt with a Muslim teacher who was suspended from her job because she refused to remove her burqa in the classroom.​[10]​
Applying the individualized test highlighted above to a teacher wearing a burqa, one would again have to ask whether the individual woman involved lacks the required open and neutral attitude towards all religions and beliefs. In the case of a woman wearing a burqa or niqab it seems less likely to me she will indeed have this open mindedness towards other religions, as they seem much more closely linked to a very strict adherence to rigidly orthodox interpretations of Islam than the headscarf. Nevertheless, I would say we should not start from any generalization in this respect either. Two other aspects of wearing a burqa, however, seem to make a general ban on them in the classroom valid. To begin with, wearing a burqa as such (which means this would hold true for any woman wearing it) seems indeed much harder to square with notions of sex equality than wearing a headscarf. Not because I would deny women’s agency in this respect and conclude they could never wear it voluntarily and as a consequence of their personal convictions, but because it seems to be an explicit act of sex segregation. In the Dutch cases that have been brought to the Equal Treatment Commission regarding face covering veils, the women concerned did not mind removing their veils if they were dealing with women only, but refused to do so in relation to men.​[11]​ In the British case this was also at stake.​[12]​ Though this may hold true also for the headscarf, the actual segregationist effect of wearing a burqa is much more intense and of a different kind because of the physical distancing from the opposite sex it entails. Thus, women wearing a burqa discriminate or at least make distinctions towards people they interact with, which are directly based on sex. This seems highly problematic to me. But even if this could be countered by showing this is not true of all burqa-wearing women, another aspect stands out which makes burqa’s quite incomparable with headscarves. This regards the aspect of communication. 
The burqa or niqab is much more problematic than a headscarf as it seriously inhibits communication in the classroom. In our culture, facial expression is an important part of communication. In a Dutch case concerning a student at a vocational school who was not allowed to wear a niqab anywhere on the school grounds, this argument was accepted by the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission as a proper justification. I think it is indeed. The argument will hold true for teachers even more. The UK-case shows this as well: the communication argument was a major reason to suspend the teacher from her job.
Besides, some other aspect of communication is at stake here that is what I would like to call mutually respectful communication. Of course this is a sensitive thing to say, but I will try to explain what I mean by this. In our society mutually respectful communication means being able to look each other in the face. Wearing a face-covering veil easily creates a power imbalance in the communication; it makes one of the parties invisible to the other, but not the other way round, thus creating a potentially intimidating atmosphere. (In this respect it is quite comparable to the intimidating effect on communication of wearing dark sunglasses.) Thus, the veil in itself inhibits functionally good communication that is mutually respectful. As this holds true for every woman wearing it, regardless of her individual intentions or attitude, a burqa can be prohibited as a general rule, without need of an individual assessment in every single case. Or rather: as an individual assessment would lead to the same conclusion in every single case because of the inherent incompatibility of a face covering veil with the quality of communication required in the classroom, it would be superfluous. In fact, in this case a very close if not perfect ‘fit’ exists between the classification (excluding teachers wearing a burqa) and the legitimate purpose (guaranteeing good and mutually respectful communication)
5.	Headscarves in the courtroom
A third hard case which was widely discussed in the Netherlands several years ago concerned a law student who was refused for the job of deputy law clerk because of her unwillingness to remove her headscarf during court sessions.​[13]​The major argument for this exclusion is also connected closely to the state neutrality principle: wearing a headscarf or any other religious symbol is incompatible with requirements of independence and impartiality of the judiciary. 
This argument comes in two kinds. The first focuses on the person expressing his/her religious convictions. A person wearing a religious symbol like a headscarf and not willing to take it off in the courtroom is not neutral/impartial, but gives priority to personal convictions. The second variety is concerned about the perception of impartiality by others. Even if the impartiality of the person involved as such is not at stake, it is important courts appear neutral to the public as well. So anything which may detract from a strictly neutral and impartial appearance must be banned from the courtroom, be it religious symbols or other personal items that may reflect certain opinions, such as a pink triangle or a ‘ban the bomb’ sign.
Would this case of conflicting rights and principles lend itself to an individualized assessment? This case is in a way more complex. I would say ‘yes’ as far as the impartiality of the individual concerned is at stake. Like in the case of the public school teacher, the question of whether wearing a headscarf is linked to a lack of impartiality and independence of the aspiring judge has to be assessed on an individual basis. Checking whether a proposed judge fulfils this requirement is essential for every single job applicant, whether this person looks neutral or not.
But if we take a closer look at the second variety of the argument the situation is more complex. If wearing any religious symbol as such detracts from the required appearance of impartiality of a judge, it is superfluous, like in the case of the burqa-wearing teacher, to look whether this holds true for the individual judge wearing a headscarf as well. But is it a convincing argument? I do not think so.
To start with, current practice is not as neutral as it may seem. In fact, all kinds of personal characteristics are visible, such as sex, age, and race. Is a religious preference more prone to be viewed as a lack of impartiality than say sex or race? If we only think of cases of rape or other types of sexual assault on women it seems clear that to have an all male or all female court can be perceived easily as a non-neutral practice by the defendant and victims or the general public. Similarly, it is not unlikely that suspects with an ethnic minority background, who are overrepresented in crime statistics, will perceive the all white courts we usually have as lacking neutrality and impartiality. But do we think this is very problematic? Not really, I would say. We trust our judges have been selected and trained well enough to be impartial. And if we would want to do something about it, it will probably be by making courts more pluralist in their composition, such as having a mixed male/female court to decide rape cases.
Secondly, I wonder how unacceptable it is if showing personal convictions would indeed somehow detract from the appearance of impartiality, if we have to balance the importance of a neutral appearance with the other interests at stake. To my mind the emphasis on the importance of courts appearing impartial is a bit overdone. We all know judges are just human and do have opinions and convictions, which will reflect in some way in their interpretations of the law. This seems unavoidable. Besides, do we really think suspects, their lawyers and ordinary people are so naïve as not to be aware of this? So would it not be preferable to see and know about a judge’s preferences instead of being unaware of them? At the end of the day it seems the way we view the judiciary is much more influenced by the quality of their decisions than by the looks of the judges. Quite interestingly in this respect, in the UK a Sikh judge is member of the High Court and participates in the court sessions without having to remove his turban.​[14]​
As far as the quality and the social acceptance of judge based law is concerned, I would suggest that both will be enhanced if legal decisions are the product of a judiciary which is composed of different sections of the population and not just of members of the dominant white majority. In this respect I would contend that the argument regarding the appearance of impartiality, whatever its validity, should not be given priority over the importance of having a more multicultural composition of the judiciary. As far as prospective female judges wearing a headscarf are concerned another argument comes in: as they are highly educated and represent the most emancipated members of their minority communities, it seems counterproductive for integration purposes to give them the message they are nevertheless not welcome in the higher parts of our society.
To conclude, I would say that in this hard case an individualized assessment is also better. Yet, it has also become clear that this may be different if we accept the second line of argument as valid (which I do not). The second line of argument does indeed suggest a ‘perfect fit’ between the classification (excluding anyone wearing visible symbols expressing personal convictions like religious ones) and a legitimate purpose (guaranteeing courts appear neutral and impartial). If such a perfect fit is present, an individual assessment becomes irrelevant. 
6.	Conclusions
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